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INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
THE CASE OF HISTORY-IN-LAW
MARK TUSHNET*
Holmes, it appears, was right. The legal scholar of the late twen-
tieth century, if not the lawyer, is "the man of statistics and the master
of economics."' Of course, just as we must now read the word man
more inclusively, so we must read statistics and economics. Legal
scholarship has become broadly interdisciplinary, to illuminate what
Holmes called the process of "weighing considerations of social ad-
vantage,"2 that he believed essential to-or even definitional of-law.
The most-cited law review article is by an economist; Justice Rehn-
quist called the third most-cited "in the area of political science, rather
than of constitutional law."'3 Other articles high on the list are even
more obviously interdisciplinary than Gunther's.
Is this appearance of interdisciplinarity accurate? Not entirely.
First, a high proportion of the most-cited articles are doctrinal in the
classic sense despite the criticisms Judge Edwards has made of a legal
scholarship that fails to engage the doctrinal concerns of the legal pro-
fession.4 Although Herbert Wechsler did sometimes develop argu-
ments that could fairly be called political science,5 his most-cited
article is purely doctrinal, devoted to an examination of the logical
implications of Supreme Court opinions. So too with the classic Tuss-
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. I have benefited from conversations with Mike Seidman and Jack Balkin in framing my
argument. Balkin, Martin Flaherty, Robert Gordon, Michael Klarman, and Brian Leiter gave
me helpful comments on a draft. They led me to make my position, bizarre as it seemed to
them-as Leiter put it, "an odd position, though not an unintelligible one by any means"-more
explicit. Every one of them argued that I was too tolerant of bad philosophy and bad history in
law, and are therefore particularly not to be associated with my argument except to be put in the
camp of those who disagree with it.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, Jr., The Path of the Law, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JUS-
"flCE HOLMES 391, 399 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
2. Id. at 398.
3. Rehnquist's article was cited in Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurispru-
dence of Centrism, 93 MicH. L. REV. 1854, 1860 (1995) (book review).
4. Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.REv. 543
(1954), which appears at number 69 on the list in this Symposium, Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Law Review Articles Revisted, 71 Cm.-KENr L. REV. 751, 770 (1996)).
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man and tenBroek article on the concept of equal protection, 6 despite
the fact that Tussman is a professional philosopher.
Second, and perhaps more important, legal scholarship that dis-
plays the form of interdisciplinarity (to use a barbarism) may not be
truly interdisciplinary. In this Article I use the example of how history
is used in legal scholarship to examine whether such scholarship ought
to be called interdisciplinary. 7 I focus on that subcategory of legal
scholarship even though it appears infrequently on the list of most-
cited law review articles, for two reasons. As a part-time historian I
am more familiar with the questions of disciplinarity that arise in the
use of history in legal scholarship than I am with the parallel questions
about economics and philosophy. In addition, to the extent that I am
familiar with those parallel questions, they seem to me to resemble
the ones I discuss here.8
I. INTRODUCTION: INTELLECTUAL VOYEURISM AND DECORATION
IN LEGAL GENRES
I take as my initial text an article by Brian Leiter whose title con-
veys its thesis: "Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship."9
Trained as a philosopher and as a lawyer, Leiter argues that some in-
terdisciplinary work is "sub-standard," containing "superficial and ill-
informed treatment of serious ideas, apparently done for intellectual
'titillation' or to advertise, in a pretentious way, the 'sophistication' of
the writer."' 10 Leiter uses an article by Gerald Frug as his foil." Ac-
cording to Leiter, Frug drops citations to Nietzsche into his article
6. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
7. Some readers might fairly ask, "Who cares?" That is, does anything turn on whether
legal scholarship can be fairly called interdisciplinary? Perhaps not much. I believe, however,
that asking the questions illuminates the practice of legal scholarship. For a discussion of what, if
anything, can be gained from efforts to police the boundaries of disciplines, see infra text accom-
panying notes 89-103 (concluding that the policing effort in itself is unlikely to be productive).
8. For example, on the rare occasions that practitioners of law and economics attempt to
offer more than the most superficial reasons why economics has something to say to law, they
tend to rely almost entirely on Milton Friedman's famous essay on the methodology of positive
economics, without acknowledging that Friedman's account of economic methodology is highly
contested among philosophers of economics. See, e.g., DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT
AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 162-69 (1992); DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETO-
RIC OF ECONOMICS (1985). This is not to take a position on the question here; I am hardly
qualified to offer an opinion that anyone ought to take seriously. Rather, it is to suggest only
that the arguments I make in this Article about the use of history in law may well be available to
those who might want to argue about the use of economics (and philosophy) in law.
9. Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79
(1992). For a similar argument, see Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in
Search of a Paradigm, 42 Duke L.J. 840 (1993).
10. Leiter, supra note 9, at 80.
11. Gerald Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988).
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without acknowledging that Nietzsche's position, when fully under-
stood, does not support the limited points for which Frug cites Nietz-
sche,12 and that Frug's appropriation of Nietzsche, while sometimes
superficially consistent with the body of Nietzsche's work, offers
claims that are highly contested among scholars more familiar with
that work.
13
I am in no position to say whether Leiter's criticisms of Frug are
accurate. 14 Assume they are, in the sense that philosophers familiar
with Nietzsche would agree with Leiter. Why should it make any dif-
ference to legal scholarship that Frug merely displays the name of
Nietzsche in his article? One reason might be that Frug could be ask-
ing his readers to accept his arguments on the ground that Nietzsche
made them. Here Nietzsche would be an authority whose word car-
ries weight. That would be a peculiar use of philosophy in law. Law-
yers must know that few philosophers examine what their
predecessors have said as a source of authority in the way a Supreme
Court decision is a source of authority in constitutional law. Philoso-
phers pay attention to Nietzsche's arguments, or Aristotle's, be-
cause-and to the degree that-the arguments carry rational force.
One can imagine that Frug relies on Nietzsche to provide him
with lemmas along the way to his own conclusion.' 5 Frug would be
assuming both that Nietzsche's conclusions are themselves well-sup-
ported-lemmas that Frug need not argue for because Nietzsche
proved them-and that they do indeed support Frug's conclusion.
And perhaps he is wrong about that. Or perhaps the fact that Frug
appears to believe-if he does so appear-that Nietzsche's arguments
support his own arguments itself demonstrates a fundamental failure
of reasoning ability: It is circumstantial evidence of Frug's inability to
make good arguments, which casts doubt on the arguments he does
make. Or, finally, Frug's failure to appreciate difficulties with his view
of Nietzsche may indicate that he has not understood the true diffi-
culty of the issues with which he is concerned: Frug may make hard
questions seem easy, and had he truly grappled with Nietzsche's work
he would have seen how hard the questions are. But in none of these
cases is the true criticism that Frug's use of Nietzsche is superficial or
ill-informed.
12. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 9, at 83-85.
13. See, e.g., id. at 88-90.
14. For what it is worth, they do have the ring of accuracy to my ears.
15. Instead of asserting, "Because Nietzsche said X, we should conclude Y," Frug might be
asserting, "As Nietzsche demonstrated, X, from which I conclude Y."
1996]
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For all that, Leiter is surely on to something. Here I think it help-
ful to introduce a distinction between philosophy1 and philosophy2.
Philosophy1 is what people regarded as philosophers do. Some, for
example, offer reasons that any reasonable person should find ration-
ally compelling for the positions they assert on matters of philosophi-
cal interest. Others, in James Tully's words, seek to "dissolv[e]
philosophical problems, not by presenting yet another solution, but by
a survey which brings to critical light the unexamined conventions that
govern the language games in which both the problem and the range
of solutions arise."'1 6 And there surely are other philosophers' prac-
tices. Philosophy 2 is different. For present purposes, philosophy2 is
the practice engaged in by lawyers using philosophy: philosophy-in-
law rather than legal philosophy.
The distinction matters because the practices of legal academics
and philosophers differ. Like philosophers, legal academics are inter-
ested in determining the truth and establishing the conditions of jus-
tice. Like philosophers, legal academics are interested in getting
tenure and building a secure reputation. And like philosophers (and
lawyers), legal academics are interested in making a case that per-
suades their audiences. Although reasons that reasonable people
would find rationally compelling form one part of such a case, legal
arguments are, I believe, more highly rhetorical than philosophical
ones.17 A good legal argument has many components. The authority
of the person making the argument itself has weight,18 for example, in
a way that may not happen in philosophy. 19 A good legal argument
quite often is one that is simple enough to encapsulate in the obliga-
tory parenthetical when it is cited, even though arguments that are
rationally compelling may be quite complicated. And, finally, good
legal arguments often have a certain rhetorical flair.
16. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLIcrY 35 (1995).
17. Of course I would not want to push the distinction too hard, for I am sure that philo-
sophical practices are also rhetorical.
18. This may be part of the reason for the heavy predominance of people teaching at the
highest ranked law schools on the list of most highly cited articles. That conclusion must be
qualified, however. For understandable reasons, people teaching at such schools have readier
access to the law reviews published at their home law schools. Until recently, those reviews were
more readily available for others to consult and then cite. It will be interesting to see what will
happen as more law reviews are easily available in computer-accessible data bases.
19. There may be a presumption, in any scholarly field, that it is worth paying attention to
arguments made by a person who has written interesting and persuasive things in the past. Yet, I
would think that philosophers would not give weight to the mere fact that John Rawls made an
argument in the way the legal academy gives weight to the mere fact that a celebrated law
professor has made a new argument. (People in both fields might, of course, come to the new
contributions with a strong principle of charity in interpretation.)
[Vol. 71:909
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Often legal scholars provide citations to fancy philosophers as a
form of decoration for their arguments. I use the term decoration for
a reason: According to one of his law clerks, Justice Abe Fortas
handed over a draft opinion to the law clerk with the instruction,
"Decorate it," meaning, "Come up with the citations to support what I
wrote. 20 For Fortas, to work in the genre judicial opinion meant that
one had to offer case authority to support conclusions arrived at for
other reasons and justified on other grounds.21
So too with philosophy2. To do it well the author must decorate it
with citations to fancy philosophers. Leiter suggests that these cita-
tions are designed to "titillate" or perhaps intimidate readers.22 Alter-
natively, they simply satisfy the genre's demands: "Nice move," a
reader might say, on seeing a citation to Nietzsche or-my favorite-
Alfarabi.23 The citation shows the author to be a Serious Person, but
within the genre of philosophy2 it is not taken as a serious effort to use
philosophical authority to support the author's conclusion. In this
sense something that is quite bad philosophy, may be effective philos-
ophy2-unless the conventions of philosophy2 are that citations to phi-
losophers are rhetorically effective only if they are good philosophy1 .24
Is the use of history in legal scholarship different? The answer
might be yes if we focus on original intent theorists of constitutional
interpretation.25 For them, the very fact that the Framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution and its amendments understood the document's
provisions in a specified way is authoritative. They need no reasons
for the constitutional positions they take; it is sufficient that the Fram-
ers and ratifiers understood the Constitution as they did.
20. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 272 (1990).
21. This is not a necessary implication of Fortas's instruction. He could have believed that
case authority was the only justification for his decision, and the only reason for arriving at it,
and could have known that such authority existed without being able to locate it himself. The
saying, "He has forgotten more law than you will ever know," suggests this position, at least to
the extent that it implies, as I believe it often does, that the subject has not truly forgotten the
law, but merely cannot retrieve it at the moment. I have argued elsewhere that Fortas's instruc-
tion is not best understood in this way, although a similar injunction issued by William 0. Doug-
las would best be so understood. Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 748. 755 (1995).
22. Leiter, supra note 9, at 80, 91.
23. See, e.g., THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 6 (1992). A citation to
Alfarabi demonstrates that the author is a student and probably a disciple of Leo Strauss. The
citation comes early in Pangle's book, and Alfarabi is never cited again.
24. Despite the criticisms I have received from those who commented on an early version of
this Article, I remain convinced that philosophy2 does not have such a convention.
25. As will appear, I use the term original intent theorists quite broadly, to encompass all
legal scholars who use historical evidence to support interpretations of law in the present day.
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There are of course standard objections to originalism, the most
potent of which is that it is, quite literally, irrational.26 Here I want to
focus on a different point. Originalist law review articles constitute
their own genre of scholarship, which I call history-in-law (instead of
history2).27 I believe that history functions in that genre as decoration
rather than authority. To support that assertion, I must first describe
the genre of historical writing.
II. THE TROPES OF HISTORICAL DISCOURSE
Few practicing historians think that all they do is dig up facts no
one knew before. Historians realize that in one way or another, they
are all storytellers. And as storytellers they operate with a few well-
established story lines, under the constraint that a historian can use a
particular story line only when it has some-often minimal-support
in the sources.28 Here I sketch four that I believe are quite common
in modem historical scholarship. 29
The first and probably oldest is the story of progressive develop-
ment, which has garnered the pejorative label Whig history. Accord-
ing to this story, today's institutions and ideas are the outgrowth of
institutions and ideas in the past. To some extent today's ideas and
institutions are really the same as those in the past: a story of con-
tinuity. To some extent they are different, but only because we have
come to understand better what those ideas mean and what those in-
stitutions are designed to accomplish.
26. There may be reasons for adopting originalism as a theory of interpretation, but there
can be no reason outside of originalism for adopting a particular originalist interpretation.
Originalists must take the mere fact that the Framers took a particular position as dispositive,
and they depart from originalism when they explain why the Framers' position was sensible,
sound, wise, or anything else-when, in short, they offer reasons to justify the Framers' position.
Originalists have done quite badly in explaining why people today should be bound to decisions
made in the past solely on the ground that the Framers made those decisions. Or, as Shake-
speare put it, "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, That he should weep for her?" WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2. It is an equally standard response to arguments like this to
assert that originalism, whatever its defects-including its irrationality-is better than alternative
modes of constitutional interpretation, particularly in constraining judicial interpretation. I
doubt it, and the arguments I made to support my doubts apparently led enough people to cite
my work for me to be included on the list in this Symposium, Shapiro, supra note 5, at 769.
27. In what follows I specifically exempt those working in the genre legal history, who I
would identify roughly as legal academics who are members of the American Society of Legal
History and who participate regularly in the Society's activities. (Obviously this distinction itself
is a form of boundary-drawing, and the concerns I raise in § IV infra about who polices the
boundaries are relevant here as well.)
28. The basic sources here are HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY (1973), and HAYDEN
WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE (1978).
29. I focus on tropes commonly used in intellectual and institutional history, which are the
closest analogues to the tropes using history in law.
[Vol. 71:909
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The historian explains how those old institutions and ideas held
the germ for (or were the seeds of-the metaphors vary) today's insti-
tutions and ideas, and demonstrates their gradual unfolding. That
which we today find unpalatable in the past is presented as incompati-
ble with the fundamental commitments of the past itself: As people
gradually became more aware of their true commitments, they dis-
carded the rest.
The story-line of decline and fall is the obverse of Whig history.
Here the historian describes how institutions degenerated. This story
has its own variants. Sometimes the historian celebrates the demise of
an institution that deserved to die. Sometimes the historian regrets
the decline, to the point of writing a jeremiad celebrating the past in
contrast to the degenerate present. And sometimes the historian sees
the features that caused the decline as inherent flaws, so that the insti-
tution was eaten away by its own commitments.
A third common story-line is irony, of which the last variant of
the story of decline and fall may be an example as well. The historian
shows what people in the past intentionally set out to do, and demon-
strates how things turned out quite differently. In some versions this
story-line resembles Whig history. To the Whig historian, the best in
today's society is the residue of the past's wisdom, and we can be en-
couraged in confronting today's injustices by the thought that this too
shall pass. To the complacent ironist, we stand apart from the past.
We look bemusedly on their illusions, and are comforted because we
know they were deluded. The complacent ironist, that is, elevates his
or her present knowledge above what appeared to be knowledge but
was actually mere prejudice.
A more self-conscious ironist understands that just as things
turned out differently from the way people in the past thought they
would, so things might-indeed, are likely to-turn out differently
from the way we think they will. This stance, too, might lead to com-
placency: Whatever you think is the best thing to do is likely to have
ironic consequences, so why bother to do anything? 30
A final story-line is complexity and contradiction. Here the histo-
rian demonstrates that the past is a foreign country where people
managed to think that things we find inconsistent were entirely com-
patible, indeed sometimes entailed by each other. The historian
30. There is a third type of ironist, who thoroughly deconstructs the narrative of irony itself,




shows how complicated yesterday's ideas and institutions were. The
simple fact that people in the past used words we use today does not
mean that those words meant to them what they mean to us. For ex-
ample, the Fourteenth Amendment's framers clearly wanted to pro-
tect what they called civil rights, but the scope of that class was
substantially narrower than what today is encompassed within the
term.31 Historians can trace how words that used to mean one thing
came to mean something else,32 with the effect of estranging us from
the past-that is, making it stranger than it seemed at first.33
Even more troubling, historians can do the same with institutions
as well as concepts. For example, a historian of the death penalty can
show that the social meaning of death and punishment in the late
eighteenth century was so different from the social meaning of death
and punishment in the world of AIDS that the institution of capital
punishment is simply a different institution today. Or, a historian of
Congress can show that the House of Representatives in the early
twentieth century was inserted into a political and cultural system
unique to that time, so that the institution we call the House today is
historically continuous with, but dramatically different from the one
that met in the same building in 1905.
An odd alliance of cultural conservatives and cultural radicals
supports the search for a usable past. The conservatives wish to find a
past to celebrate as a model for today, and the radicals look for ele-
ments in the past that they think offer hope of radical transformation.
Mostly, however, historians try to emphasize the pastness of the past.
They take up particular events, ideas, and institutions as they were in
the past, and situate them in as full a context as they can. By doing so,
they hope to dissolve any illusions that we can easily learn lessons
from the past, or identify straight-line connections between single
ideas or institutions in the past and today's ideas and institutions, or
even between small-scale complexes of ideas and institutions then and
now. Precisely because the whole world was different then, particular
ideas and institutions were different.
These and other story-lines, not the discovery and mere presenta-
tion of facts, constitute the practice of history. Once we understand
31. Most notably, today we think that people have claims against private entities for denials
of civil rights, a concept that would have baffled the Fourteenth Amendment's framers.
32. See, e.g., RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS (1976); DANIEL RODGERS, CONTESTED
TRUTHS (1987).
33. Historian Robert Darnton writes of "the unfathomable strangeness of life among the
dead." ROBERT DARNTON, THE Kiss OF LAMOURETrE at xiv (1990).
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that history is a practice, a new set of questions arises. What consti-
tutes a good performance within that practice? Who determines what
constitutes good historical practice? These questions return us to my
discussion of Leiter's criticism of intellectual voyeurism. There I sug-
gested that Leiter's criticisms were misplaced because he misunder-
stood the practice he was criticizing: He thought it was philosophy and
applied philosophers' standards, but it actually was philosophy-in-law,
which must be assessed by other standards.
Similarly, seeing history as a practice, we might wonder whether
the criteria for good performance have much bearing on other prac-
tices. In particular, the criteria for determining whether someone has
done well at the practice of history-in-law may be different from those
for determining whether someone has done well at the practice of his-
tory, and they may be developed and applied by lawyers and legal
academics rather than historians.
III. THE TROPES OF HISTORY-IN-LAW
A. Law-Office History and Whig History
Thirty years ago constitutional historian Alfred Kelly, who had
assisted the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People's legal team in developing a brief on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's historical background, 34 criticized what he called law-office his-
tory.35 To Kelly, law-office history was characterized by "the selection
of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or
concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance
of the data proffered. '36 Law-office history was, Kelly asserted, often
"very bad history indeed. '37 "It fails to stand up under the most su-
perficial scrutiny by a scholar possessing some knowledge of Ameri-
can constitutional development. ' 38
One difficulty with Kelly's definition of law-office history is that
law-office history that disregards contrary evidence and the like is not
very good advocacy. As Jefferson Powell puts it, "[S]ystematic anach-
ronism and quotation out of context is unconvincing advocacy and un-
acceptable scholarship. 39  Truly effective law-office history
34. See MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RiGHTs LAW 197-99 (1994).
35. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119.
36. Id. at 122 n.13.
37. Id. at 126.
38. Id. at 132.




acknowledges the contradictory data and explains them away.
Michael McConnell's originalist scholarship is law-office history of the
highest quality, as one might expect from an advocate of McConnell's
talents. By examining it, we may obtain a greater understanding of
one aspect of the practice of history-in-law.
Recently McConnell offered a revisionist interpretation of the
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
school segregation.40 The conventional wisdom is that in its framers'
and ratifiers' understanding, the Amendment did not make school
segregation unconstitutional. Without recapitulating the supporting
evidence in detail, I can summarize it in a few sentences. The Amend-
ment's framers and ratifiers distinguished among civil, political, and
social rights, and believed that the Amendment protected civil rights
alone. There was some uncertainty about the contours of each cate-
gory, but when opponents asserted that the Amendment would re-
quire school desegregation, supporters responded that it would not,
because school attendance involved a social rather than a civil right.
41
In addition, the Congress that sent the Amendment to the states for
ratification itself enforced school segregation in the District of
Columbia.
McConnell makes an ingenious argument against the conven-
tional wisdom. McConnell's argument has several important ele-
ments. As an originalist he seeks the original understanding of the
Amendment's framers and ratifiers. Unfortunately, direct evidence of
the ratifiers' understanding of the Amendment's implications for
school segregation is hard to come by.42 Popular opposition to school
desegregation was admittedly widespread in the North, but the
Amendment was adopted in extraordinary times, "when a political
minority. . . imposed constitutional change on the Nation. . .with
little regard for popular opinion. ' 43 Congress' acceptance of segrega-
40. See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995).
41. The evidence supporting this aspect of the conventional wisdom is summarized by Mc-
Connell. See id. at 959-60.
42. The evidence, though hard to locate, is actually more extensive than McConnell ac-
knowledges. See Michael McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown. A Reply to Profes-
sor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937, 1944 (1995) ("Although in theory, evidence of the
understanding of the state legislatures at the precise time of ratification would be a superior
basis for interpretation, it does not exist."). It does exist, for example, in reports in local newspa-
pers at the time of ratification. The NAACP had several volunteer lawyers examine such evi-
dence in preparation for the reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See TuSHNET, supra note 34, at 196-97. The results are available in the NAACP Papers (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, box II-B-141).
43. McConnell, supra note 42, at 1939.
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tion in the District of Columbia may have reflected the constraints of
contemporary politics rather than a principled understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment's implications. Or, it may have reflected the
fact even its framers did not fully understand the implications of the
principles to which they were committed. They were, however, com-
mitted to the protection of civil rights. When the Amendment was
adopted, it might have been reasonable to think that access to educa-
tion was not a civil right, because it was then "in a fledgling and uncer-
tain state. '44 By 1900, and certainly by 1954, "[c]ommon schools had
become the 'pillars of the republic." 45 Thus, given the framers' own
understanding of the concept civil rights, by 1900 or 1954, access to
education without regard to race was a civil right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
McConnell's argument about the concept of civil rights is not en-
tirely original. It can be found in embryonic form in Brown itself, with
Chief Justice Earl Warren's statement that "we cannot turn the clock
back to 1868," but "must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. '46 I developed it in slightly greater detail for anti-
originalist purposes.
47
More original is McConnell's quite ingenious argument about the
Civil Rights Act of 1875. A cynic might say that McConnell argues
that Congress' failure to outlaw school segregation in 1875 demon-
strates that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers and ratifiers under-
stood in 1868-69 that school segregation would become
unconstitutional upon the Amendment's adoption. McConnell dem-
onstrates that a majority in each house of Congress at separate times
voted to outlaw school segregation in the course of considering the
1875 Civil Rights Act. Congress did not enact the prohibition, how-
ever, because of some procedural obstacles that made it impossible for
both houses to agree on the provision at the same time.
44. Id. at 1951.
45. Id.
46. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). McConnell quotes and criti-
cizes the first of these statements, but does not quote the second. McConnell, supra note 40, at
1132 & n.859.
47. Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800-01 (1983) (developing analogy between right to contract,
treated as a civil right in 1868, and right to access to education in modem United States).
Against the claim that this sort of analogizing demonstrates the "indeterminacy of originalism,"
McConnell asserts that this sort of analogizing is "not a matter of mere conclusory labelling or
assertion, but of reasoned legal argument, which we can understand and evaluate." McConnell,
supra note 42, at 1951-52. He actually addresses only half of the argument against originalism,
which claims that other analogies are just as well-supported by reasoned legal argument.
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How does the debate over the 1875 Civil Rights Act illuminate
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment? Not, of
course, because the Amendment's adopters believed that Congress
had some authority to interpret the Amendment. 48 Congress has to
act to exercise such authority. The procedural obstacles McConnell
discusses are just as much a part of the process by which Congress
exercises its interpretive authority as the substantive provisions it en-
acts. Nor does McConnell contend that constitutional super-majori-
ties in Congress supported desegregation, but only that majorities
did.
49
Once McConnell's argument is unpacked, we see that the votes in
Congress are far less decisive than the scores of pages McConnell de-
votes to them make them seem. The question is what the Amend-
ment's adopters understood it to mean. One way to find that out is to
examine what they thought the Amendment meant after it was
adopted. So, for example, when one of its supporters argued in 1874
in favor of a statutory ban on school segregation on the ground that
the Fourteenth Amendment made segregation unconstitutional, we
can infer, albeit with some qualifications,50 that the supporter had that
same understanding in 1868-69. McConnell demonstrates that a large
majority of members of Congress in 1874 who had been in Congress in
1868 and who supported the Amendment then argued against school
segregation on constitutional grounds. He infers that those who sup-
ported the Amendment in 1869 (when it was ratified) probably under-
stood it to enact a principle against school segregation.
Nothing whatever in this argument turns on the fact that both
houses of Congress voted to prohibit school segregation. McConnell
uses positions asserted in the 1874 debates to determine what the
Amendment's supporters in 1868 understood it to mean. Members of
the 1874 Congress are simply a convenient sample of the 1868
supporters.
How might a constitutional historian address McConnell's argu-
ment? First, and perhaps most obvious, a constitutional historian, un-
derstanding the argument's logic, would ask for more evidence: What
48. I have no idea whether the Amendment's adopters did understand the Amendment in
this way, but as I show next, such an understanding is irrelevant anyway.
49. See McConnell, supra note 40, at 953 ("In a large number of votes over a three and one
half year period, between one-half and two-thirds of both houses of Congress voted in favor of
school desegregation and against the principle of separate but equal.").
50. The supporter's views may have changed, or he might be strategically or rhetorically




reason is there to believe that the congressional sample is representa-
tive of the Amendment's supporters in 1868? One might think that
the congressional sample consisted of the most persistent and dedi-
cated political activists, whose views might have been more radical
than those who served and retired. What did the Amendment's sup-
porters who were not in Congress in 1874 think? A historian would
try to track representatives and senators from 1868 who left Congress
to see what they believed. Did they write private letters discussing the
proposed ban on school segregation?51
Second, and more interesting, what might a historian say about
McConnell's argument about the concept of civil rights? A historian
might attempt to embed the concept of civil rights in a larger intellec-
tual, political, social, cultural, and religious universe. 52 A historian
would ask most narrowly, How did people connect the concept of civil
rights to their understanding of the proper roles of legislatures and
courts in a democratic United States? Although today we think that
courts automatically enforce most principles embedded in the Consti-
tution, perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment's adopters had a different
view. They might have thought that, at least in some dimensions, the
question of school segregation presented what we would now call a
political question. The Constitution, they might have thought, en-
acted a principle condemning school segregation, but that principle
was to be enforced solely through legislative action.
A historian would also want to know whether the concept of civil
rights was bound up with broader concepts about the well-ordered
society. If it was, as I suspect, it might help to understand the religious
framework within which the adopters operated, because their concept
of civil rights would ultimately be connected to their religious views,
through their vision of the well-ordered society. More specifically, a
historian would want to know how the 1868 concept of civil rights was
connected to the 1868 vision of the public role in providing education,
not in the sense of whether people in 1868 thought of access to educa-
tion as a civil right but in the sense of whether their vision of the
51. A standard argument against using private letters from congressional supporters of a
proposed constitutional amendment as evidence of the ratifiers' understanding is that those let-
ters were unavailable to the public when it considered the amendment's adoption. For a version
of the argument, see McConnell, supra note 40, at 954 ("Constitutional interpretation by its
nature depends on public statements and public acts.... [W]hat matters is their public position
on what the Constitution means."). Post-ratification evidence like McConnell's is subject to the
same objection, which-as I indicate in the text-I do not believe to be a serious one.
52. Cf. Powell, supra note 39, at 674 ("The founders' comments on constitutional issues
always are parts of a larger historical and intellectual whole.").
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public role in providing education affected the way they defined civil
rights.
As the horizon of inquiry broadens, the historian would become
increasingly nervous about McConnell's mode of argument. That
mode holds the concept of civil rights constant and inserts new facts
about education. But if the facts about education are complexly
bound up with the definition of the concept of civil rights, it is not
obvious that one can fairly insert new facts without adjusting the con-
cept of civil rights itself. The rhetoric of the conventional wisdom cap-
tures this point as follows: Someone who concludes that inserting new
facts into old concepts leads to conclusions that we know the adopters
rejected probably doesn't have a real grasp on what those old con-
cepts were. Perhaps if we recalled a Republican senator who served
in 1868 from the grave and taught him about the place of education in
1954, he would tell us that of course access to education was a civil
right under those new circumstances. But perhaps he would tell us
instead that he would structure his concept of civil rights to guarantee
that it would not encompass access to education under those new
circumstances. 53
McConnell's is, I emphasize, exceptional law-office history. His
rhetorical skill allows him to lead readers to think that the votes in
1874 were in themselves important. 54 He is extraordinarily talented at
accounting for contradictory data. In discussing segregation in the
District of Columbia, for example, McConnell forthrightly points out
that proposals to desegregate the schools were defended, even by the
adamantly anti-slavery Senator Charles Sumner, on policy rather than
constitutional grounds.55 But, McConnell points out that "the Four-
teenth Amendment did not apply to congressional legislation," with
the consequence that "senators were free to vote in accordance with
their assessments of practical impact. . . rather than according to the
perceived dictates of the Constitution. ' 56 True enough, but perhaps a
53. Similarly, the senator might say that his substantive concept of civil rights indeed en-
compassed education under the new circumstances, but might point out that the complex of
ideas he held about civil rights included an understanding that courts would not enforce all
constitutional rights; in a legal universe where courts do enforce all constitutional rights, he
would not include education within the complex procedural-substantive concept of civil rights.
We misunderstand the concept of civil fights that he himself held in 1868, although he now
knows that he expressed himself inartfully, because he could not know what was going to happen
with respect to public education or the judiciary as social institutions.
54. On the rhetorical level, McConnell accomplishes this by devoting as many pages as he
does to those votes, thereby inducing readers to believe that the votes are in themselves
significant.
55. McConnell, supra note 40, at 977-80.
56. Id. at 980.
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bit too cute: A historian might note that congressional Republicans
were the political heirs of those who had made abolition of the slave
trade in the District of Columbia the centerpiece of their efforts to
attack slavery within the ante bellum constitutional framework. They
might wonder how those politicians, having won the war and proposed
a highly principled rejection of segregation in schools everywhere else
in the nation, somehow were merely practical in considering desegre-
gation in Washington.
McConnell says that to read Congress' actions "as proof that the
Congress of the day viewed segregation as constitutionally legitimate
is to overread the evidence. '57 As "proof," surely. But how about
"strong evidence"? And, after all, McConnell is asserting that "the
Congress of the day viewed segregation as constitutionally illegiti-
mate."58 It is hardly overreading the evidence regarding segregation
in the District of Columbia to think that it provides no support
whatever for that proposition. McConnell is adept at using the rhetor-
ical strategy of overstating his opponents' claims without appearing to
do so, and then reasonably rejecting the overstated claims.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of McConnell's rhetorical
ability is found in his discussion of post-1869 cases in which courts
were asked to rule on the legality of school segregation. According to
McConnell, from 1868 to 1883, nine Northern supreme courts consid-
ered the constitutionality of school segregation: Five-a majority-
found that school segregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Four others invalidated school segregation.59 McConnell ac-
knowledges that the courts striking segregation down relied on state
law, although sometimes the state law used equality language that,
McConnell asserts, allows us to "infer that the court would have given
the Fourteenth Amendment a similar construction had it reached the
federal constitutional issue."' 60 In one interesting move, McConnell
discounts decisions by the California and Indiana supreme courts on
the ground that "California had not ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Indiana was notoriously the most racist of the Northern states,
and both courts were dominated by Democrats, the party hostile to
57. Id.
58. His precise words are, "[S]chool segregation was understood during Reconstruction to
violate the principles of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1140. Note the equivo-
cation on "during Reconstruction" here.
59. Id. at 971-75.
60. Id. at 972.
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Reconstruction."' 61 Courts upholding segregation, readers are invited
to infer, were motivated by mean political considerations, while those
striking it down were motivated by deep constitutional principle.
McConnell concludes:
The experience in the Northern states during the fifteen year period
after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment thus falls short of
proving that school segregation was understood to violate the
Amendment, but it is also inconsistent with the equally extreme
view that the Amendment had no bearing on the issue.62
This is a classic rhetorical move, describing two extreme positions and
implicitly asking readers to take a position in the middle, here that the
Fourteenth Amendment had some bearing on the question of school
desegregation. Along the way, readers may lose sight of two proposi-
tions. McConnell's originalist argument is precisely one of the ex-
treme views, that the Fourteenth Amendment's adopters understood
it to make school segregation unconstitutional. And, perhaps more
interesting, McConnell's evidence is actually this: With the exception
of one unappealed lower court decision, not a single post-1868 court
held that school segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and
every court but one to consider the question held that it did not.
It is important to emphasize that I am analyzing McConnell's
rhetoric here, treating his work as history-in-law rather than as his-
tory. If my arguments have any bite, they do so because they identify
places where even as talented a rhetorician as McConnell slipped. So,
for example, he might have done better to avoid the rhetorical strat-
egy of describing two extreme positions when his is one of them. And
yet even that suggestion must be qualified. With respect to what audi-
ence would McConnell "have done better"? Not, I think, with respect
to his primary audience. Consider the likely citation patterns for Mc-
Connell's article.63 The standard parenthetical is likely to be "(argu-
ing that original understanding supported holding segregation
unconstitutional)." It will be followed by something like: "Contra
Klarman, Response." It is unlikely that the criticisms contained in this
61. Id. at 974. I particularly like the reference to California's failure to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment. McConnell carefully does not claim that California's supreme court was thereby
relieved of its obligation to enforce the Amendment. Cf. id. at 972 (discussing an 1868 Iowa
Supreme Court case invalidating segregation before Fourteenth Amendment was legally
binding).
62. Id. at 977.
63. Concurring in Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas cited the article to support the fol-
lowing proposition: "Brown I itself did not need to rely upon any psychological or social-science
research in order to announce the simple, yet fundamental truth that the Govenrment cannot
discriminate among its citizens on the basis of race." Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2065
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Article will be picked up at all. This Article is in a Symposium on
legal scholarship, not on segregation or originalism, and its title does
not suggest that somewhere embedded in the article is a criticism of
McConnell's argument.64 The criticisms I have offered are therefore
unlikely to impair the enduring rhetorical effectiveness of McCon-
nell's article. Why, then, should he bother to improve on an already
highly effective product?
A historian reading McConnell's work might be tempted to echo
a comment made about the Charge of the Light Brigade: "C'est
magnifique, mais ce n'est pas l'histoire. ' 65 The historian would be
wrong, and not only because one can translate "histoire" as "story."
McConnell tells a compelling story within the genre of law-office his-
tory, which is history-in-law, not history as done by historians. The
criteria for evaluating how well he performs are drawn from law
rather than history. And, indeed, McConnell himself may think so.
Responding to a critic who argues that constitutional history should
consider "historical forces-political, social, economic, ideological,
cultural," 66 McConnell writes that, when offered as a reason to avoid
attempting to justify or criticize Supreme Court decisions, "this is not
just an attack on originalism. It is an attack on the traditional enter-
prise of constitutional law, in which the meaning of the Constitution is
seen to be a legitimate question for historical and interpretive in-
quiry. ' 67 He was engaged in a legal inquiry, not a historical one.
B. History Lite and the Search for a Usable Past
The past decades have seen the invention of two major constructs
in the intellectual history of United States law: civic republicanism and
classical legal thought. I use the words invention and construct advis-
edly. Martin Flaherty describes much of the literature on civic repub-
licanism as history "lite. ' '68 Having scavenged the secondary historical
64. As a result, even computer-assisted research techniques may not make a difference
here: The first move in the research strategy may be to locate citations to McConnell's article;
the second is to look at the list of titles; the third is to discard those whose titles do not suggest
that they contain substantive comments on McConnell's article. In light of my emphasis on the
role authority plays in legal scholarship, it may be worth noting that occasionally this Article will
survive the third step because my name appears as its author.
65. Pierre Bosquet, quoted in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 136 (Angela Parting-
ton ed., 4th ed. 1992) ("C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre.").
66. Michael J. Klarman, A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1934
(1995).
67. McConnell, supra note 42, at 1955.




literature,69 legal scholars found something that seemed attractive,
and then pursued original sources to discover snippets that could be
quoted in support of their contemporary positions. They then created
a body of thought they called civic republicanism. Historical material
is almost exactly described as decoration in this literature.
Civic republicanism was attractive to the center-left in the legal
academic spectrum. A similar construction occurred, I believe, fur-
ther to the left, as Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz invented
what they called classical legal thought or liberal legalism. In both
cases the constructs serve the legal academy well, but are problematic
from a historian's point of view.
1. Civic Republicanism and the National Identity
The difficulties with the civic republicanism construct, treated as
history, are well-known, and I merely sketch them here. 70 I have al-
ready outlined one set of problems. Civic republicanism is a term that
describes one part of a complex intellectual universe in the founding
era. As historians have shown, it existed in uneasy tension with ideas
about religion and commerce. What the ideas of civic republicanism
mean in a nation with far greater religious pluralism than existed at
the founding, and where commerce is global, is quite unclear. Just as
the post-Civil War concept of civil rights had the meaning it did be-
cause it was part of a larger complex of ideas, so did civic republican-
ism. Taking "it" out of its context makes it into something else. What
it becomes may be interesting or normatively attractive, but it has lit-
tle relation to the ideas actually held at the founding.
Then too the ideas actually held at the founding may not be all
that attractive. Some of its contemporary advocates are attracted to
civic republicanism because it provides an account of public citizen-
ship that contrasts with the intense privatization of concerns republi-
canism's advocates attribute to liberalism. 71 Their critics responded
that civic republicanism as it actually was had unattractive aspects-
militarism, anti-feminism, and elitism-that make it an unappealing
69. The term "scavenge" is drawn from Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE
L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988).
70. Descriptions of civic republicanism appear at numbers 47 and 93 on the list in this Sym-
posium, Shapiro, supra note 5, at 769, 771.
71. It may be appropriate to note here that while I am sometimes linked to contemporary
civic republicans, see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviv-
ing?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989), my endorsement of the concept was heavily qualified. See,




model for contemporary constitutional thinking. Stripping civic re-
publicanism of those elements, while normatively attractive, converts
it into a body of thought actually held by no one in the past. Notably,
modern civic republicanism tends to treat slavery in classic Whig fash-
ion: as an excrescence fundamentally incompatible with the founders'
deepest commitments.
As Martin Flaherty notes, lawyers' appropriation of civic republi-
canism is more sophisticated than other originalist scholarship, but it
nonetheless drains the founders' intellectual universe of its real com-
plexity. 72 I believe the reason is that modern civic republicans are not
truly interested in history as such. Again, Flaherty makes the point
well. Cass Sunstein, according to Flaherty, does not "invoke[] the
Founders solely as one might cite Antonio Gramsci or Michel Fou-
cault, that is, on the strength of the usefulness of ideas put forward by
thinkers who otherwise have no direct connection to our constitu-
tional culture." Rather, he "invokes [them] for. . the authority that
springs from their historical connection with a document and the cul-
ture it continues to shape. '73
Modern civic republicanism offers a Whig interpretation of our
present national identity.74 The people of the United States are con-
stituted not by ethnicity or religion, but by our shared commitment to
the Constitution.75 That commitment is reproduced by creation-nar-
ratives that describe our origins in the Constitution and by tales of
development that connect the creation to the present. To modern
civic republicans, their vision of civic republicanism at the founding
provides a more attractive national identity than the narrative that
describes the founding as liberal through and through.
The claim might well be correct in that comparative version.
Consider, however, an alternative creation-narrative that acknowl-
edged the historical complexity of the founders' intellectual universe.
Such a narrative would connect us to a world in which liberal and
republican elements were both available, where republicanism in-
cluded militarism and elitism as well as public-mindedness, and where
liberalism included pure selfishness and the power of self-making that
Crevecoeur celebrated. I confess that I find the identity constituted
72. Flaherty, supra note 68, at 571-74.
73. Id. at 574.
74. The following draws on Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and
Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 845 (1996).
75. The underlying normative claim, I believe, is two-fold: that commitment to some supra-
individual identity is a human good, and that one important supra-individual identity is national.
I find the first element compelling, the second far more problematic.
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by that narrative far more interesting and normatively attractive than
the identity constituted by Whig civic republicanism. For one thing, it
acknowledges on the national and historical levels complexities in na-
tional identity that parallel the complexities of personal identity that
introspection reveals.
In some sense, then, better history would give us a better narra-
tive of national identity. That, however, is plainly a nonhistorical ar-
gument. History "lite" is satisfactory as a form of history-in-law to the
extent that one finds the national identity it constitutes more attrac-
tive than the alternative that historians' history would constitute.
2. Classical Legal Thought and the Puzzle of Critical Legal
Histories
The second great invention of recent studies of the intellectual
history of legal thought is classical legal thought. Here too the work is
so familiar that I will not describe it in detail. 76 Briefly, classical legal
thought is said to be a body of thought characteristic of the late nine-
teenth century. It relied on highly abstract distinctions, for example
between the state and the market, that generated legal conclusions
across the entire range of law.
The narrative of classical legal thought combines two historians'
story-lines: decline and fall, and irony. As Robert Gordon put it in an
early assessment, the story describes "how the construct was purified
of its preliberal elements and elaborated to its highest pitch in the late
nineteenth century; and how, at the moment of its perfection, it
started to decay under attacks from without and the pressure of its
own internal contradictions. ' 77 And, according to Gordon, we still are
"living in its ruins, no longer believing in its. . . powers, and clinging
to it still because we have found nothing to replace it .... -78
Gordon calls liberal legalism a construct, which "arose and devel-
oped its own characteristic set of mediating devices" in the nineteenth
century.79 In his usage, as elsewhere in the literature on classical legal
thought, the body of thought was constructed by people in the past.
On closer examination, however, it appears that classical legal thought
76. The only work specifically about classical legal thought on the list in this Symposium,
Shapiro, supra note 5, at 767, appears at number 42, but others-e.g., numbers 80 and 83 (01-
sen)-are strongly influenced by the construct.
77. Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 115 (1984).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 114.
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was constructed in the late twentieth century rather than the late
nineteenth.
A signal of the difficulty with the construct is that "it" seems to
be a living-though decaying-historical subject. The actual people
who adhered to classical legal thought rarely appear in scholarship
discussing it. 8° And for good reason. As constructed in recent schol-
arship, classical legal thought is a highly rationalized body of thought
that seemed for a moment to resolve all contradictions. It decayed
because it did not. I am not a specialist in late nineteenth century
legal thought, but I have looked closely enough at works by people I
would have thought associated with classical legal thought-Christo-
pher Tiedemann, James Bradley Thayer, and George Ticknor Curtis-
to know that what they actually believed was more complex than the
story of classical legal thought allows.8' Indeed, precisely because
classical legal thought is a construct created in the late twentieth cen-
tury, we can be reasonably confident that no one ever adhered to it.82
Why, then, pay attention to classical legal thought? Kennedy and
Horwitz did identify some interesting things in late nineteenth century
legal thought, which earlier scholars had not seen. They then drew the
strands they identified together into the construct classical legal
thought. That construct may function in some ways as an ideal type.
People familiar with the construct are able to read the sources differ-
ently, seeing in each source one or another of the themes that form
the construct.
Scholars who see classical legal thought as an ideal type may be
misled in ways that Gordon's argument suggests. In usages drawn
from Max Weber's confrontation with Marxism, the term ideal type is
connected to a sense that ideal types do more than draw diverse
80. For a criticism along these lines, see Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writ-
ing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1992)).
81. For a discussion of Tiedemann and Thayer, see Mark Tushnet, Thayer's Target: Judicial
Review or Democracy?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 9 (1993), and, for a discussion of Curtis, see Mark
Tushnet, George Ticknor Curtis, in AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (forthcoming 1998).
For example, Curtis, who died in 1894, was a Unionist Democrat whose concerns about law
and order led him to strongly oppose the New York draft riots. After the War Curtis became a
leading patent lawyer, representing Cyrus McCormick and Samuel F.B. Morse. Shortly before
he retired from the active practice of law, Curtis took up the cause of Utah's Mormons, of all
people, represented Mormon interests in the Supreme Court, and wrote powerful pamphlets
defending their right to religious liberty. Curtis's thinking about law cannot be captured by the
simplifications of classic legal thought. For an elaborate demonstration of the complexity of
legal thought in this era, see Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Responsibility in the Age of Pound:
An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915 (1995).
82. For an exemplary study of how one lawyer actually thought about law, see DANIEL R.
ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR 24-48 (1995).
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strands together. 83 Ideal types also have an associated dynamic. In-
tellectual history, of the sort represented by Kennedy and Horwitz,
deals with ideas. The analogue of the dynamic of an ideal type in
intellectual history is the connection among ideas. How, then, were
the ideas of classical legal thought connected to each other? Not, ac-
cording to Horwitz at least, because one followed inexorably from an-
other.84 Indeed, Horwitz's work is designed to show that ideas people
believed to be connected rationally were in fact not so connected. To
make this argument, however, it is essential to show that some people
actually did think the ideas were connected. Drawing together strands
that appear in the work of different people-creating an ideal type-
will not do.85
As a form of critical legal history, classical legal thought is said to
be connected to our current way of thinking about law. Again, the
metaphors vary: Residues of classical legal thought can be found in
ours; classical legal thought has left us a legacy on which we still live;
our thought is genetically connected to classical legal thought; the con-
struct classical legal thought helps us identify continuities between
legal thought then and now. But, because no one actually adhered to
classical legal thought, these claims are puzzling.
As with modem civic republicanism, contemporary creators of
classical legal thought may have noticed statements made in the nine-
teenth century that somehow resemble statements made today, and
assert connections. At the same time, they insist that classical legal
thought was a highly interconnected body of thought: If a person ad-
hered to one element of classical legal thought, he was quite likely to
adhere to a great many others. At this point, the relation between
classical legal thought and the present becomes quite obscure. In
their best work, the modern creators of classical legal thought succeed
in the historians' enterprise of emphasizing the pastness of the past.
They make classical legal thought quite strange by describing how its
adherents managed to think that many concepts, which we today see
as quite unrelated, were actually tightly bound together.
Its creators offer classical legal thought as a critical enterprise.
The more strange it is, however, the more puzzling is the claim that it
83. See MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 213, 352 (Max
Rheinstein ed., 1954).
84. See HORWITZ, supra note 80, at 33-63.
85. 1 do not doubt that some people actually did believe that some of the strands were
rationally connected, and that in the universe of late nineteenth century legal thinkers we can
find a network of connections drawn by one or another thinker that actually covers the entire
construct of classical legal thought.
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offers a critical perspective on modern legal thought. If one thought
that classical legal thought combined elements that were logically mu-
tually entailed, one would have some critical leverage. Suppose a
critic thought that some people adhered to one element of classical
legal thought that the critic found unattractive, and thought as well
that people rejected other elements on the ground that they found
those elements unattractive. If the elements of classical legal thought
were mutually entailed, the critic could then chastise them for logical
inconsistency, and hope that they would abandon the critic's disfa-
vored element rather than embrace the elements they currently reject.
Unfortunately, that is not how the literature on classical legal
thought reads. It emphasizes internal contradiction rather than insist-
ing on logical entailments. Although its adherents are presented as
believing that classical legal thought constituted a logically integrated
whole, they were wrong. Actually, according to today's scholars of
classical legal thought, classical legal thought was nothing more than
an ensemble of disparate elements, bricolage in Levi-Strauss's terms.86
This way of presenting classical legal thought has some critical
bite, but not much. Consider again the critic who finds some aspect of
today's legal thought unattractive. If the critic's targets believe that
legal thought consists of logical entailments, they may believe that
some logical necessity compels them to accept some things they dis-
like in order to get other things they like more. Critics may combat a
false necessitarian strain in today's thinking by demonstrating that
classical legal thought was bricolage even though its adherents
thought it consisted of logical entailments. 87 The critic might thereby
induce readers to discard a rule if they initially believed it to be an
unfortunate but necessary consequence of other, more fundamental
rules.
If all legal thought is bricolage, however, the idea of genetic con-
nections between past legal thought and today's, and the ideas of lega-
cies and residues, become quite hard to understand. Consider, for
example, a concept like patriarchy. Legal scholars surely can identify
elements of legal thought in the nineteenth century properly denomi-
nated patriarchal, and they can do so as well with elements in contem-
porary legal thought. But, precisely because the earlier elements were
part of an ensemble of ideas strikingly different from today's, the con-
86. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 17 (1966).
87. 1 believe that this is the dominant theme in Gordon, supra note 77.
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cept patriarchy cannot mean the same thing when applied both to
older and to contemporary ideas.8
8
The construction of classical legal thought looks like history, but
it is not history as historians would do it. It overlooks too much com-
plexity in the way people in the late nineteenth century actually
thought about law, and it fails to connect their legal thought to any-
thing other than a vaguely described economic system and a badly
specified conservatism. That said, classical legal thought is perfectly
fine history-in-law. Its creators, like the modern civic republicans,
have substantially affected the way we think about law, whether or not
they have taught us much about the past.
IV. POLICING THE BOUNDARIES
One might think that some historians' standards could be rele-
vant to assessing the use of history in legal scholarship even if history-
in-law is a genre of legal scholarship rather than a version of historical
scholarship. 89 That would be true to the extent that those who engage
in one practice take seriously the comments and criticisms made by
people who engage in another. It might be part of the practice of
history-in-law, for example, that criticisms levelled by historians count
against the persuasiveness of a history-in-law argument. Most nota-
bly, one might think that legal scholars using history in law would per-
form badly if they got the facts wrong.90
One might think that, but one would be wrong.91 In 1992, the
Yale Law Journal published an article by two well-regarded scholars in
which they made a number of elementary factual errors. 92 One is par-
ticularly striking: The authors asserted that Robert Morris made cer-
88. See Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996), for an interesting though undertheorized effort to establish a genetic
connection through a process Siegel calls "preservation-through-transformation in the structure
of a status regime," id. at 2178.
89. Flaherty, supra note 68, at 551-52, argues for invoking standards that "come from the
discipline of history itself" because historians "commonly resolve what is historically convinc-
ing," and because it makes sense to defer to specialists.
90. See id. at 552 ("Perhaps the most basic [criterion] is simply getting elementary facts
straight.").
91. Historians have other standards as well, but they seem to me as much standards of
effective argument, such as "Do not disregard contrary evidence" and "Do not quote out of
context," as they are standards of good historical practice.
92. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation
Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992), with errors identified in John 0. McGinnis, The President,
the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and
Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REV. 633, 634-35 n.7 (1993).
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tain statements at the Constitutional Convention. 93  In fact,
Gouverneur Morris made them.94 A historian would find this a signif-
icant mistake. To understand what the speaker meant, an intellectual
historian would say we have to understand how those statements fit
into the speaker's overall intellectual universe. The historian would
try to relate the speaker's statements about the President's power to
nominate to the speaker's views about popular democracy, aristoc-
racy, the well-ordered government, religion, and much else. A histo-
rian would at least worry that a set of words uttered by Gouverneur
Morris really meant something quite different from the same set of
words uttered by Robert Morris.95 If one misidentifies the speaker,
that effort at real understanding simply cannot get off the ground.
Of course even historians make mistakes. Sometimes the mis-
takes may be irrelevant to the historian's argument. 96 Or sometimes a
historian may have sufficient authority, based on his or her prior work
or the power of the argument elsewhere in the piece where the mis-
take occurred, for historians to treat a mistake as harmless. Neither
response seems to me available here.97
As we have seen, history-in-law does not really try to explain
what people in the past thought. A misidentification is therefore not
terribly significant. Indeed, the critic who pointed out the identifica-
tion error did not regard it as a scholarly failure. He concluded, in-
stead, that "The Yale Law Journal must share responsibility for many
of the[ ] errors." 98 And the authors responded, "We are grateful to
[the critic] for correcting some errors in identifying the first names of
certain delegates. We do not believe, however, that these errors are
relevant to the correctness of the propositions discussed in our es-
say."99 That is nicely put: The error lay in providing the wrong first
name, not in naming the wrong person. Of course even these scholars
93. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 92, at 1498.
94. See McGinnis supra note 92, at 639 n.29 (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTnON OF 1789, at 539 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
95. McGinnis, id. at 639-40, does briefly describe Gouverneur Morris's broader views.
96. I am embarrassed to note that in TUSHNET, supra note 34, at 176-77, I located Topeka in
Oklahoma, as part of a transition between one discussion and another. But I am embarrassed.
(I also note that I am invoking my authority qua historian here.)
97. One can, just barely, construct an interpretive theory according to which the mere fact
that some founder-no matter who-uttered certain words has some bearing on how the Consti-
tution should be interpreted. If originalism in its best forms is questionable, this bastardized
originalism seems completely implausible. (Jack Balkin suggested the possibility of such an in-
terpretive theory to me, without endorsing it.)
98. McGinnis, supra note 92, at 635 n.7.
99. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, On Truisms and Constitutional Obligations: A
Response, 71 TEx. L. REV. 669, 672 n.17 (1993).
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would undoubtedly have preferred to get at least the names right, 100
although they appear unconcerned about the relation between a per-
son's particular statements and the overall context of thought that can
deepen our understanding of those statements.
This is only one example, but surely it is suggestive. Getting the
facts right did not matter much to these authors or even to their critic.
Yet it would seem that the least demanding requirement a historian
would impose on a legal scholar's use of history is that the legal
scholar get the facts right. The practice of history-in-law apparently
can go on even when that requirement is not met. 10 1
Readers of a draft of this Article sounded Jefferson Powell's
theme.'0 2 Bad history, they urged, was bad advocacy and therefore
was bad history-in-law, just as Leiter believes that bad philosophy1 is
bad philosophy2. I may be too cynical, or I may have read more
widely in the literature that constitutes history-in-law, but my under-
standing of the practice is that the connection between the standards
of discipline1 and those of the legal academy is much looser than
that.10 3 Asking legal scholars to satisfy even the most basic criteria
drawn from the practice of history misunderstands the practice of his-
tory-in-law.
V. CONCLUSION
Law-office history has a bad name, at least among historians. It
shouldn't. 104 Law-office history is a legal practice, not a historical one.
The criteria for evaluating it, for determining what is a successful per-
100. Similarly, practitioners of history-in-law undoubtedly think they are writing history, just
as practitioners of philosophy 2 may well think they are doing philosophy. The connection be-
tween engaging in a particular practice and thinking that you are engaging in a different one is
quite complex. I find Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773
(1987), the most helpful introduction.
101. This would not be true if the article or its authors lost credibility because of its sloppi-
ness with respect to historical detail. It is not my impression that this has happened, although I
have been told that some scholars "think that even this mistake was indicative of a general
insouciance about history that robs the argument of much of the force it sought by invoking
history in the first place." (I regard the source of the information as confidential.)
102. See supra text accompanying note 39.
103. Martin Flaherty pointed out to me that this may change as more scholars with formal
training in other disciplines become law professors. I confess to some skepticism. Although a
full-scale defense of my position is out of place here, I simply assert the following: The politically
motivated resurgence of originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation has generated
what is now a very large body of legal scholarship-history-in-law-that is (a) quite bad accord-
ing to historians' standards, and (b) published in the most prestigious law reviews.
104. Having gone back and forth in my mind over including this footnote, I decided to point
out that this Article is written in the trope of irony. My ambivalence about including this foot-
note reflects my concern that I have failed if the footnote is necessary.
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formance, must be drawn from legal practice rather than from histori-
cal practice.10 5 I believe the same conclusion can be drawn about
interdisciplinary legal scholarship generally. In this sense, lists like the
one that opens this Symposium are extremely helpful in identifying
the legal academy's criteria for good performance.
10 6
105. 1 have refrained from describing those criteria, in large part because the material dis-
cussed in § IV supra shakes my confidence in my ability to do so. That is, my first candidate for
doing history-in-law well probably would have been that it helps to get the facts right. With that
off the list, I am puzzled about what comes next.
106. A cynic might say that the list indicates that the two main criteria are that a good per-
former have a job at a top-ranked law school and write articles that students at top-ranked law
schools regard as worth publishing. As a colleague and I have argued elsewhere, however, this
cynical view fails to appreciate that the causal arrow may run from "having high potential as a
good performer" to "having a job at a top-ranked law school" rather than, as the cynic would
have it, the other way. Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords:
A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 COrNST. COMMENTARY 463, 468-69 (1994-95).
1996]

